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Reusing Shares in Secret Sharing Schemes
YULIANG ZHENG. THO:\1AS HARDJO]\;O A)jD JENNIFER SEBERRY

The Centre/iii' Computer Securit\' Resl!arch, Departlllellt of COII/puter Science, L'llin'rsityof
Wollongollg, Ill)lIollgollg, NSI-V2522, Australia

A (t, w) threshold scheme is a method for sharing a secret among w shareholders so that the collaboration
of at least t shareholders is required in order to reconstruct the shared secret. This paper is concerned
with the re-use of shares possessed by shareholders in threshold schemes. We propose a simple (t, w)
threshold scheme based on the use of cryptographically strong pseudo-random functions and universal
hash functions. A remarkable advantage of the scheme is that a shareholder can use a single string in
the share of many different secrets; in particular, a shareholder need not be given a new share each time
a new secret is to be shared.
ReceilTd Septemher lY93, rerised Jalluary 19<)4

I. II'TRODLCTION

The problem of maintaining a secret among II' shareholders whereby at least t of them are required to
cooperate before the secret can be reproduced was first
posed by Shamir ( 1979) and Blakley ( 1979). Since then
a number of (t, IV) threshold schemes have been suggested
by researchers in the field of cryptography (Simmons,
1989), These schemes provide the property that by using
any t or more pieces of the shared secret, which are
called shares hereafter. the whole shared secret can be
derived. while at the same time maintaining that any
t - 1 or less shares will be insufficient to derive the
shared secret. The shared secret itself can be a master
key to a cryptographic system. a vault-lock combination
or even a decision which must be arrived at by at least
t members in an organisation.
A common drawback of these proposed schemes is
that each time when a shared secret is recovered. all
shares of the secret, including those which did not
partici pa te in the recovering process. become useless.
Therefore each shareholder has to be given a new share
when a new secret is to be shared. In this paper we
propose a simple (t. w) threshold scheme based on the
use of the pseudo-random function family (Goldreich
et al. 1986) and the universal hash function family
(Carter and Wegman. 1979; Wegman and Carter, 1981).
This scheme can remedy the above mentioned drawback.
Another remarkable advantage of the scheme is that a
shareholder can use a single string in the share of many
different secrets.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will
discuss the background in the basic constructs necessary
for the foundation of the secret sharing scheme. In
particular, this will consist of the definitions of pseudorandom function families and universal hash function
families. Using these basic constructs, the secret sharing
scheme is presented in Section 3. which is followed by
an example of the scheme in Section 4. Section 5
discusses security and recycleability of the scheme. and
THE COMPUTER JOCR:"\AL,

Section 6 compares the scheme with that suggested by
Shamir ( 1979) together with a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the scheme, The paper lS
closed by some remarks and conclusion in Section 7.
2. BASIC CONSTR VCTS

Denote by . l' the set of all positive integers. I the
alphabet {O. I} and #S the number of elements in a set
S. Denote by n an integer in . I' that determines many
parameters such as the length of a shared secret, the
length of shares. the security level of a secret sharing
scheme and so on. In the literature such an integer 11 is
called a security parameter. By x E RS we mean that x is
chosen randomly and uniformly from the set S.
We are concerned with collections offunctions induced
by the security parameter 11. In particular. we are interesE I F n, an infinite family of functions, where
ted in F =
F" is a collection of functions from Illn) to Iml"), namely.
Fn= UlfIlln)--+Imln):. We call F a function family mapping I(n)-bit input to mini-bit output strings. F is said to
be pol.l'llomial time computahle if there is a polynomial
time (in 11) algorithm that computes alifE F. and samplahle if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
that on input 11 E . l' outputs uniformly at random a
description OffE FIJ' Note that if F= UnE \ Fn is samplable. then the description of a function in Fn is 'compact'
in the sense that the length of the description is bounded
by a polynomial in II.

Un

2.1. Pseudo-random function families
This subsection introduces the concept of pseudorandom functions. Intuitively. a function family F =
E \ Fn is a pseudo-random function family (PRFF) if
to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. the output
of a function f chosen randomly and uniformly from Fn'
whose description is unknown to the algorithm, appears
to be totally uncorrelated to the input of l even if the
algorithm can choose input for f The formal definition
is described in terms of (uni/tinn) statistical tests fill'
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ill!lclioll.\. ;\ luniforml statistical test for functions is a
prohahili~tic polynomial time algorithm .4 that given n
as input and access to an oracle 0 r for a function
f:LIIII1_<[ItIIIII. outputs a hit 0 or 1. The algorithm A can
query the oracle only by writing on a special tape some
x E L IIII ( and will read the oracle answer/(.\) on a separate
ans\\cr-tape. The oracle prints its answer in one step.
Definition 1 Let F = lj II ( 1FII be an infinite family of
functions. where FII = :flfLIIIII->LnlllIl:. Assume that F is
hoth polynomial time computable and sam pia hie. F is
a PRFF itr for any statistical test A. for any polynomial
Q and for all sufficiently large 11.

( II
where I'!' denotes the probability that A outputs I on
input 11 and access to an oracle Or for/E RFII and 1';, the
prohability that A outputs I on input n and access to
an oracle 0, for a function /' chosen randomly and
uniformly from the set of all functions from LIIIII to LIIIIIII.
The prohahilities arc computed over all the possihle
choices off /' and the internal coin tosses of A.
The concept of pseudo-random functions were first
introduced by Goldreich l't 01. ( 19R6). In the same paper
they haw also shown that PRFFs can be constructed
from pseudo-random string generators (Goldreich et ul ..
1l)~61. By a result of ImpagliaZlo l't al. (19~9) and
H~lstad (1990 I. the existence of one-way functions is
sutlicient for the construction of pseudo-random function families.
We are interested in a particular type of PR FFs F =
Ivill ' FII' where FII can be represented by FII =
U,:,!\!ii!.\ E L". Idx:LIIIII->LnllIIl:. For such a PRFF. each
function in FII is uniquely indexed by an l1-bit string in
L". Thus to sclect a function from FII uniformly at
random. we only have to choose a random l1-hit string.
In practice. such a PRFF can be easily constructed
from a strong data encryption algorithm. The most
\vidcly used data encryption algorithm is perhaps the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) proposed by the
1'iational Bureau of Standards of America ( 1977). DES
is a strong encryption algorithm that transforms a 64-bit
plaintext into a 64-bit ciphertext using a 56-bit key.
Without knmving the key. the output of DES appears
to be indistll1guishable \vith a random 64-bit string. We
can consider DES as a set of functions. namely DES =
: dl'S'dxlidx E L Oh • dCS'd\:L 64 -> Lh4:. Each dn'dx is uniquely
speeified by a 56-bit string idx and implements a permutation on L,,4. To complete the construction of pseudorandom function family. we can assume that there is an
infinite family of DES-like algorithms. say DES I . . . . .
DES,,,. DES'h' DES 5 - . . . . . where each DES, is an
encryption algorithm that is designed using the same
principles as for designing DES 5 !> (= DES) and transforms an (i + R)-bit plaintext into an (i + ~ I-bit ciphertext
using an i-bit key.
I

2.2. L niwrsal hash function families
L'l1ircrsal hash fUllction fillllilil's (UHFFs) (Carter and
Wegman. 1979; Wegman and Carter. In I) play an
THE COMPL lLR JOt;R'-;AL.
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essential role in many recent major results in cryptography and theoretical computer science (H~lStad. 1990;
Impagliano l't 01 .. 19R9; RompcL 1990). Let H=
UII I fIn be a family of functions mapping 1(III-bit input
into mln)-bit output strings. For two strings x . .\' E L/[1I1
\vith .\ # L we ~ay that .\ andy collide with each other
under hE HII or x and.\' are sihlings under It E JIll' if
hlx)=II(y).
Definition 2 Let 1i = U". ,If II bc a family of functions that is polynomial time computable. samplahle
and maps I(lJi-hit input into m(II)-bit output strings. Let
DII = Ix E Lltllll:lll E H",:l.\' E L lllilli such that 11(\)=.\': and
R" = :.\' E Lltli/llj:lh E ll", :lx E LIIIII such that.\' = IIlx):. Let
k~2 be a positive integer. H is a (strongly) h.-UHFF if
for all II. for all k (distinct) strings XI' X2 ..... x, E D" and
all k strings .\'1' .1'2 ..... Yk E R/I' there are #HII I#R,i
functions in H" that map 'I to .\'1' X 2 to .\'2' .... and X k
to Yk'
An equivalent definition for the (strongly I k-universal
hash function family is that for all k (distinct) strings
XI' X2' .. " ' k E D", when 17 is chosen uniformly at random
from HII' the concatenation of the k resultant strings
.1'1=171.'1) . .1'2=17(\2)' .... rk=h(xd is distributed randomly and uniformly over the k-fold Cartesian product
R~ of Rw The following collisioll ocu'ssihilitr I'rope/'tr is
a useful one.
Definition 3 Let H = iU" ,H" bc a family of functions that is polynomial time computable. samplable
and maps /(11)-bit input into m(lIl-bit output strings. Let
k ~ 1 be a positive integer. 1i has the k-collision accessibility property. or simply the collisio/l occl'ssihilit.\' I'rol'ertL if for all II and for all I ~ i ~ k. given any set X =
:x l • x 2 • .... x,: of i strings in LIIIII. it is possible in
probabilistic polynomial time to sclect randomly and
uniformly functions from H;;. where H;; c HII is the set
of all functions in HII that map XI' X 2 • .... and x, to the
same strings in Llllini.
k-UHFh with the collision accessibility property can
be obtained from polynomials mer finite fields (Carter
and Wegman. 1979: Wegman and Carter. 19R I). First
\ve note that there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between strings in LIIIII and elements in GFi 2/1111 1.
This allows us to interchange a {(11)-bit string and an
element in GFi 2/111 \ l'iow denote by P II the collection of
all polynomials over GF( 21(111) with degrees less than k.
I.e.

P II = :uO+uIX+··.+il k IXk-llll o.
a I'

.... ii, _

lEG F(

211111 1: .

( 2)

For each I' E P let 171' be the function obtained from ()
by chopping the first 1(11)-m(ll) bits of the output of I'
whenever 1(11) ~ m(l1). or by appending a fixed mill) -1111)bit string to the output of I' whenever 1111)<111111). Let
HII=:ilI'II'EP II :. and H=ljllc1Hw Then H is a
strongly k-universal hash function family, \vhich maps
I(/I)-bit input into m(n)-bit output strings and has the
collision accessibility property.
II'
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3. A :\EW SECRET SHARI:\G SCHE\lE

This section describes a new (t. \I') threshold scheme for
\I' = O( log II). where II is the length of a secret to be
shared. We assume that each secret K to be shared has
a serial lIumher iIi J.:' \Ve also assume that the I\, shareholders have identities / D 1• / D 2 • .. '. / D".. respectively,
For simplicity thc \I' shareholders will be denoted by
['1' C· 2 ..... C'" .. respectively, In descrihing the scheme.
we assume that there is a trusted deI/IeI' who holds a
secret K to he shared. The scheme II ill be described in
terms of the following three aspects:
1. Illitial Status of the dealer and the \I' shareholders,
') Dispersing Phase in which the dealer splits the secret
K into \I' pieces. each of which corresponds to a
shareholder. in such a Ivay that at least t of the pieces
are required to reconstruct the shared secret K.
J, Re(,()l'erillg Phase in \vhich t or more shareholders
work together in order to reconstruct the shared
secret K,

3.1. Initial status
Initially. the dealer holds an n-hit secret K to be shared
and each shareholder L', has a II-bit secret key Ki which
is randomly chosen by the shareholder. The dealer
should determine a PRFF F= :F,,!II E,
where F,,='
:t,d,lidx E L"'/'.i,:L1r"i--->L": and each functionf,dx E F" is
specifled by an n-bit string idx, The dealer should also
determine a .::-UHFF H = :H"III E,
which is based on
polynomials over finite fields and maps an n-bit input
into II-bit output strings and has the collision accessibilily property (sec Section 2.2). where .::. which is to be
determined belO\v. denotes the total number of combinations of the I\, shareholders taken at least t at a time,

I:

1. For each set Bi (1 ~i~.::). merge the keys K". K i , . " "
K i , of the shareholders C· ir . L"o' " .. C:,. in Bi together
hy the usc of the following biHvise exclusive-OR
operation:

Xi=!J.:)I i.i, )ffi!~)I,,)ffi"·fJ.:,,(/'i,l

(5)

where j denotes the number of shareholders in B,.
eachfJ.:,i(li.i) is provided to the dealer by shareholder
C', and Ii,i r is the concatenation of II\. (ii and SJ.:
(i,e, Ii,',: GilINd, It is assumed that the length in hits
ofIi"r is 1(11). !\Iote that the secret key K , l1fsharel1nlder
C' i is used as an index to specify a function in FI/'
One reason for the need to use the function f is tl)
ensure that onlv actual shareholders arc able to derive
the string Xi' Hence an clement of authenticity. in
that only shareholder C', knows K i• is introduced into
the scheme. The key Ki held by shareholder ['i
represents a share of the shared secret K,
') Choose uniformly and randomly from H" a function
h such that the .:: resulting \'alues X l' X 2- .... X
corresponding to the sets B 1• B 2 • " .. Ho arc mapped
to the secret K. i.e,
0

(6 )

1 Make the function h public along with the fact that
h is associated Ivith the shared secret with serial
number NJ.:.

I:

3.2. Dispersing phase

3.3. Recovering phase
When the shareholders ['I!' U ,O ' " .. [ ' " in the set B, want
to reconstruct the shared secret K. they put together
f~)Ji",).f~)Ii,i). " .. f~)Ii,i,l and calculate

Then they calculate

Recall that the numher of ways to choose an i-element
subset (0 ~ i ~ \I) from a II'-element set is
(J)

From this equation. the number of combinations of the
II' shareholders taken at least t at a time will consist of
the following summation:
(4)

Denote by B 1• B 2 • .... Bo the.:: different combinations
of the II' shareholders taken at least t at a time, Note
that 11'=()(IOgll) and that .::=O(2")=O(2,lo p )=O(n')
for some constant c. For each B i• we associate it with a
II'-bit identity G i, Thc;-th bit ( 1 ~j ~ w) of G, corresponds
to the shareholder U j • and it is set to 1 if and only if U j
is a memher of B i ,
The core part of the secret sharing scheme is the
following steps taken by the dealer:
THE CO\IPCTER ]OL'R:"AL.

K=h(X i )
which is the shared secret to be recovered.
Using this method any combination of at least tout
of the II' shareholders can get together corresponding to
one of the sets Bi(i~'::1 while maintaining secret their
o\vn keys through the use of f After the shared key I\.
has been used. and thus known to the shareholders in
set B i• it is discarded and a new key K' is selected
together with a new function il' from H" that maps X'I'
X~ . .... ){~ to K'. Here X;. X~ . .... X~ represents the new
values derived from f due to the change in the serial
number NJ.: to the new serial number iV J.: .. More details
on these issues are presented in Section 5,
4. AN EXA:\lPLE

This section presents a practical example that employs
the
encryption
algorithm
DES = : des,tlxliJ'\ E L"h.
des iJx :L 64 ---> L6~: as a pseudo-random function, We consider the case where \I' = 4 shareholders U l' L' 2. C·.1 and
VOL.
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L'~ are involved in a t = 2 secret sharing scheme. The
total number of comhinations of four shareholders taken
(at least) two at a time will he

Xl.l=deSkj(lDI G 1 Sk)
X1.2=des kj (lD 1,G 2 Ski
X 1..1 =des kj (lD I I Gjl i'i k )
Xl.o=des k pD 1 IG·I,Y k )
Xl. H =des k ,(lD 1,IG H iNk)
Xl.y=deskj(lDl!iCiy N k )
X 1.11 =des kj (lD I IG 11 I1iV k )

More specifically. we have the following eleven ditlcrent
groups B I' B 2' .... B II' each has at least two shareholders:
GI=IIOO

X 2.1 = desk)! D211 Ci 1 II'" d
X 2.-1 = desk)! DJG-liliVk)
X 2." = des k2 (l D211 Gsil N k)
X 2.0 = deSk)! D211 G_II /',,' k)
X 2.8 =desk )/ D211 GHII iV k )
X 2 . 1O = dcs k )!D21 Gj() IN d
X 2.11 =des k pD 2 1G 11 1N d

G 2 = 1010

Gj

=

IOC)]

G~=OIIO

G,,=OIOI

8 6 = :C'.1'

L'~:.

G,,=OOII

B-=:[·I.['2'[·.1:'

(;-=1110

8 s = :C· I. C· 2 •

U~:.

G8 = 1101

8 y = :['1' C·.1'

C·~:.

Gq = lOll

W 2• ['.1'

C'~:.

G111 =0111

810=

B 11 = :[' I' [' 2' L'.1' C' -I:'

X3.2=deskpD.11 G 2 Sk)
X .1.-l=dcs kpDj i IG-I'IS d
X3.6=deskJ/D3IG61'Yk)
X.1.o = deskp D3 IG~ ! N d
X3.9=desk,(lDlIGyINk)
X.1.11l = desKP Dlll G1011 iV k )
X j . 11 = des K ,il D 311 Ci 11 liN d

Gil = 1111.

In the abo\t~ table G 1. G2 ..... Gil are the identities of
the groups.
Each shareholder C';. I :S i:S 4. selects a 56-bit random
string /\.; and keeps it secret. K 1• /\.2' K3 and /\.~ will
participate 111 the secret sharing and recoverIng
procedure.
Now suppose that the dealer has a 64-bit key K which
he \\ants to disperse into the four shareholders in such
a 'Iva;. that two or more of the shareholders can recover
the secret key /\. at a later stage. We further suppose
that /\. has a 10-bit serial number Sk associated with it.
and each shareholder C'; has a unique 50-bit identity
! D,. Thus the length of the concatenation of a 50-bit
shareholder identity. a 4-bit group identity and a 10-bit
serial number is precisely 64 bits.
The de~tler initiates the secret sharing procedure by
informing the four shareholders the lO-bit serial number
.\' k' Note that C; 1 is a member of

L' -I'.

X -1.3 = deSk)! D-III GJij /\: k)
X-I.5 =dcsk)lD-IIIGsIIN d
X -1.6 = deSk)! D-III G611V k)
X -I.S = deSk.)! D41 Ci x ,S d
X-I.y=dcs k )!D 4 Gy iNk)
X -1.10 = deSk)! D-I I CilUl N d
X-I.ll= deS k)!D-I G 11 1,Y k )
I

After collecting all the 2R strings from the four shareholders. the dealer derives from them II new strings.
each corresponds to one of the II groups:
Xl =Xl.lEBX 2 . 1
X 1.2EBX 3.2
X j =Xl.3EB X -I ..1
X -I = X 2.-lEBX.1.4
X 5 = X 2.SEBX -1.5
X6=X3.6EBX4.h
X 0 = X 1.·EBX 2.oEBX.1.X 8 = X I.XEBX 2.HEB X -l.H
X 9 = X 1.9 EBX.1.9 EB X 4.9
X 10 = X 2.lOEBX 3.lllEBX -1.111
XII = X 1.11 EBX 2.11 EBX 3 . 11 EBX 4.11

)( 2 =

B 1. B 2 • B j • B-. Bx. By. B 11 .
[:, a member of
B 1. B~. B,. Bo. BH• B IO • B 11 .
L'.1 a memher of
B 2 • B-1' B". B-. By. B 10 • B 11 .
and

C'~

a member of

B l. B 5 • Bh • BH • By. BlIJ. B 11 .
Cpon receiving N k from the dealer. the four shareholders
use the encryption algorithm DES to calculate the
following 64-bit strings and pass them over to the dealer.
Till

COMPUTER JOLR]\;AL.

Since there are eleven different combinations (groups).
the dealer chooses a II-UHFF H = {Il,,11l E. I} with the
collision accessibility property. As is mentioned earlier.
this can be done hy letting H" he the set of all univariable polynomials on GF(2") with degree not larger
than ten. Now the dealer chooses from Hb-l a random
function h(x)=aO+alx~ ~alOxlO such that the eleven
results Xl' X 2 • ...• XII are mapped to /\. in the following
VOL.
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I n determining h. the dealer should consider t\\n cases:

I. The 11 strings X I' X 2'
The II strings X l' .X' 2'

~

... ,
....

X II are distinct.
X II are 1101 distinct.

In the first case, the function h(\)=U O -'-(/I'+
is uniquely determined by solving the following
linear equations for a o. a 1 .... (/10:

+ (/1",10

U"+(/I

X 2 + ... + (/1OX1" = K

As the 11 strings X I' X 2' .... X 11 are distinct. the linear
equations have a unique solution.
I n the second case, not all the II strings Xl' X 2' ...
. X II are distinct. Without loss of generality. suppose
that only the first I ~I'< II strings XI' X 2 • .... Xr arc
distinct. The dealer now chooses 11 -- I' random {A-bit
strings X;+I . . . . . .\"11 so that X I .X 2 ..... X r .X;+I ... ·.
X; I are all distinct. Then the dealer uses the same
method as for the tirst case to solve a set of 11 linear
equations for II(J. a l •.. '. (/10' This gives the function hi,) =
(/0+ 11 1'\+ .. , +U IO ,,10

Once the function h is determined. the dealer passes
over the description of h. namely the 11 coefficients
u(J. Ill' .... uj(). to all the four shareholders. Alternatively.
the dealer can make the description of II available to all
shareholders by putting it into a public tile. This completes the dispersing phase.
Later when two or more shareholders. say L'I and
L' ,. want to recover the shared secret key K. they put
together

and

and compute
XI

=

X 1.1 EBX 2 . 1·

Now the secret key can be recovered by calculating

After the key K is recovered. X I. X 2 ..... XII all
become useless. as all shareholders who participated in
the recovering procedure know the secret key K. Note
tha t in recovering the shared secret key K. a shareholder.
say U i • reveals only a ciphertext .Y i . to other shareholderls). The ciphertext docs not contain useful
information on the shareholder's secret string K i • Hence
K i remains un-compromised and is only known to the
shareholder ['i' This clearly indicates that even after K
THI' ('O\IPl'TFR JOlR'>AL.

is recovered. the shareholder l, can still usc K, III tlIt:
share of a new secret key.
5. S E (' L R IT \: A:\ D R E C \: C L L\ HI LlI' 0 I
THE SCHE\IE

This section discw;ses the full(l\\ing t\\ll iSSlIl"; (111 the
scheme: s('cIII'i1\' and r('( rc!cuhiiilr. SecuJ'lty IS m;lilll"
concerned with the uncol11prnllll';;lhilit" of the shared
secret agalllst the illegal enllahnration of I I shart:11lllders. while recycleability is concerned with the unpredictability of the keys of shareholders after the
reconstructiun of the shared secret.
Researchers distingui,h t\\O Ineb of secllrlty of a
secret sharing scheme. One is called illjimllllli(lil IlIe(ll'd',
s('cllriry and the other C(!}Il111ll1lliuIllii .\('(,lIl'i1\. A i I, II)
threshold scheme 1S illjill'll/llriull rhcurcliclil/r .IC( lire if the
collaboration of 1-1 shareholders docs not re\eal ;111\
additional information on the ,hared secret in the sen~e
of Shannon 11(49). r\ote that in this detinition 1](1
limitation IS imposed Oil the cUll1putational p(l\VeI" (11'
shareholders. For this reason. IJ1formatioll tht:(lretlc
security is also called III1CUlidiliullai .ICdlrill' or pcrkll
securilY. For many practical applicatiolls. a Iuoser security. computational security. IS enough. A formal detillltion of computational securit~ is IJ1troduced 111 the
following.
Consider a (I, II) threshold scheme. \\here II =
1\'111).1 ~1=1(1l)~1\ and II is the securlt) parameter.
Denote by .~ " the key space IJ1de\ed by II and f)" the
probability distribution over .;\'" accmdlllg to \\ hlch
keys from .;\"" arc chosen. Assume that the Cllmputational power of shareholders is bounded hy probabilistiC
polynomial time. Let K be a shared secret \\hlch Is
chosen from;\"/I according to D". Dennte by p.I!),,) till'
probability that i( I ~ i < I) shareh"lders succeed in
extracting the shared secret K by collaboration. and h"
PoiD,,) the maxImum probability that a prohahilht!c
polynomial time algorithm. which is ,marc or the probability distribution Dn' succeeds in obtainll1g K (In input
11. Informally. a threshold scheme is computatlOllall)
secure if the difference between the probabilities fl, and
flo is negligible. In other \\ords. the illegal collabor,ltiun
of i < I shareholders brings no ad\antage 111 the ntraction of the shared secret K.

Definition" Let D" be a probabilIty distrihutinn 1111
a key spaceW/,' A I 1.1\') thres]wld scheme IS COlllplll<lliollal/y .1'('('111'1' with respect to !)" if I'm ~tny pnl" 11 01 111 a I
Q. for an: I ~i<1 and for all sutlicienth Llrgc II.
Ifli(D,,)- Pol!),,)1 < 1 QUI). A I 1,1\) threshuld s,'heme IS
compuIliliol1ul/r seCllre if it is c0ll1putati()Il~i11y Sl'l'lllT
with respect to the uniform dhtributlllil ull the kl'\
space .~' II'
Our secret sharing ,ch,:l11e usc, 0I1e-\\:I) funl'lilllls 111
an essential way. therefore It C,11l llot hl' lI1rlHmatiun
theoretically secure. We 110W pnl\e that It IS compul;ltionally secure.
VOL.
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THFORE'.1 1 The (t, \\.) threshold scheme presented in
SectlOn 3 is computationally secure for \\' = O( log II).
]\Iote that for this scheme, the key space IS
,,= L". Therefore, when a shared secret K is chosen
uniformly at random from 1('", we have Po(D,,) = 12",
where D" denotes the uniform distribution on .;fn. Now
\ve sho\\ that for any i < II and for any polynomial Q \ve
ha\e p,(D,,) < lQ(II) for all sufficiently large /1. Suppose
for cllntradiction that there are i < t shareholders who
can extract by collaboration the shared secret K with
probability l.Q(II). Since instances of the UHFF based
on polynomials over linite fields arc easily invertible, the
i shareholders can obtain the exclusive-OR of the outputs
of f specified by keys unknown to the i shareholders.
I These keys arc possessed by shareholders not collaborating with the i shareholders.) This contradicts the
un-predictability of the PRFF. From PolD,,) = 1 i2" and
[7,iD,,) < 1 Q(II) we have Ip,(D,,) - PolD,,)1 < LQ(Il). This
completes the proof.
Proof

1(

r

LJ'

A secret sharing scheme has recycleability property if
no information on the keys of shareholders is released
after the re-construction of shared secrets. The
recycleability property of our secret sharing scheme
follows from the fact that the outputs of instances of
PRFF on difTerent inputs look un-correlated to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. Note that
recydeability is equivalent to the property that shareholders can use the same keys in sharing ciifferent secrets
simultaneously.
6. COMPARISO;\; WITH

SHA~lIR'S

SCHEME

The scheme suggested by Shamir ( 1979) consists of the
division of a shared secret K into 1\" pieces K I , K 2 , ....
K" and the usc of a polynomial
p(x)=a O +a 1x+a 2 x 2 + '"

+(['-I X '

1

(11)

of degree t- 1 to disperse the pieces. By placing (/n = K
and e\aluating
K 1 =p(ILK 2 =p(2), ... ,K,,=p(\\')

(12)

any subset of 1(1:;:; w) of the Ki values can be used to
find the coefficients of p(x) by interpolation and the
shared secret K contained in (/0 can then be recovered
by simply calculating p(O)=ao=K. The calculations are
done modulo a prime P where P > \1' and P > K, and
the coefficients of the polynomial arc chosen randomly
from the elements of the finite field GF(P).
I n our scheme the concept of sharing a secret that is
only retrievable by the collaboration of at least I shareholders is fundamentally the same as that suggested by
Shamir. However, an important difference lies in the fact
that the shareholders do not hold pieces of the secret in
the sense of Shamir's scheme. Rather, each shareholder
holds a key, any I (at least) of which can be combined
together to recreate the shared secret. The keys of the
shareholders are maintained as a secret by each shareTilE
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al.

holder in the same manner that he or she woulci maintain
the secrecy of his or her share in Shamir\., scheme.
Inherent in our approach is the advantage that the secret
key of a shareholder can be selected by him or her. and
can be used many times independent pf the shared secret.
Another advantage of our approach is the variable
length in bits of the shared secret K. In general the
shared secret K can be polynomially longer than that of
the secret key Ki of each shareholder L'i' This ccmpares
favorably with Shamir's scheme where the shared key K
and the key Ki of the shareholder L', arc of eLjual iength
A further advantage lies in the fact that our scheme
can be easily adapted to a gelleral (/('('css strllctllrc. The
notion ofa general access structure refers to the situation
where a secret can be dividl:'d among a set of shareholders
such that any "qualilicd subset' of the shareholders can
reconstruct the secret while the unqualified suhsets
cannot (Ito et (//., 1987: Benaloh and Leichter. 19(0).
The (t. \\") threshold scheme is in fact only a special case
of the general access structure. It is not clear ho\\
Shamir's threshuld scheme can be adapted to a general
access structure.
Our scheme has a disadnllltage in the small number
of shareholders II', i.e. \\" = Ollog 11), where II is the length
in bits pf the shared secret K. Recti! that the number of
combinations of the 1\' shareholders taken at least I at a
time is
( 13)

which is of order O( 2"l In generaL for a :-uni\ersal
hash function family 11 = : H)/1 E I :' the size of a
description of a function liE H" is of order 0(11'.::) =
0(11'2"') which grows exponentially with \\" where (' is a
constant. For practical purposes we must maintain the
sile of the description of h to be of order O(II J ) for some
constant d. ThIS means that we must keep \I' to he of
order II' = 0 (log II) for the scheme to he practical.
However, this restriction does not render the scheme
unusable since many practical situations require a small
number of shareholders. This is particularly true in the
case of a vault in a bank where the authority to open
the vault of a hank director may be distributed among
a small number of II' managers in the form of shares of
the key K to the vault. Then at least I of the II (t:;:; \I')
managers would be required in order to open the vault
when the director is unavailable.

7. CO;\;CLlTSIO:\, A:\,D RE'IARKS
In this paper we have presented a simple secret sharing
scheme based on the PR FF (Goldreich el (//., 1986) and
on the UHFF (Carter and Wegman, 1979). The scheme
employs combinations of I\" shareholders taken at least
t at a time. These different combinations form a number
cJ sets of shareholders, each of which represents an
individual input to an instance of the universal hash
VOL. 37,
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function family \vhich maps the inputs to the desired
shared secret. The advantage of our approach lies in the
freedom of each shareholder to choo~e his or her own
~ecret key (corresponding to his or her 'piece' of the
shared secret) and in the reusability of his or her secret
kcy which is not compromised even when the shared
sccret is recreated by t or more shareholders.
Our approach to secret sharing has opened a number
of avcnues for further research. These include research
into linding schemes that will remove the restrictions on
the size of I\" and into other mathematical constructs
suitable for the formation of secret sharing schemes
having recyclable shares.
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